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NOTE AND COMMENT 
Nr:cr:ssITY oF VALID CONTRACT To SUPPORT EscRow.-In Foulkes v. 
Sengstacken, (Ore. 1917) 163 Pac. 3n, it is said that "A pure escrow pre-
supposes the e.xistence of a valid contract with sufficient parties, a proper 
subject matter, and a consideration. There must be an actual contract of 
sale on the one side and of purchase on the other, and until there is such 
a contract, the instrument executed by the supposed grantor, though in form 
a deed, is neither a deed nor an escrow.'' Accordingly it was held that per-
formance of conditions by a grantee: after the grantor had withdrawn the 
instrument from the custodian was ineffective to accomplish a conveyance. 
In its decision the court follows Da·vis v. Brigham, 56 Ore. 41, 107 Pac. g61, 
Ann. Cas. l9I2B 1340, where the same doctrine, though probably not neces-
sary to the decision, was laid down. 
There has come to be considerable authority in the way of text-book 
statements, dicta by courts, and a few actual decisions, for the above proposi • 
tion: 16 CYc. 562; n AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, (2nd ed.), 335; I DtVLIN, 
Dr:nos, §313; Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y.. 192, (1874); Hoig v. Adrian College, 
83 Ill. 267, (1876); Nichols v. Opperman, 6 Wash. 618, (1893), (but see 
Mamiing v. Foster, 49 Wash. 541, g6 Pac. 233; King v. Upper, 57 \Vash. 130. 
106 Pac. 612, u35, 31 L. RA. N. S. 6o6); Fitch v. Bunch, 30 Cal. 2o8, (1866); 
Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282,. (1891); Holland v. McCarthy, 16o Pac. !o69, 
(1916); Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, (I8i7); Clark v. Campl;~!!, 23 Ut. 
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56g, 65 Pac. 496, 54 L. R. A. 5o8, 90 Am. St. Rep. 716, (1901). See also An-
derson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250, 85 C. C. A. 468, (1907); Brown v. All-
bright, no Ark. 394. 161 .S. W. 1036, Ann. Cas. l915J? (1913). This doi:trine 
seems to have re~ived the approval of Professor BIGI>LOW, of the University 
of Chicago Law School, 26 HARV. L. Rsv. 565. 
A very effective and seemingly complete answer to the doctrine of the 
principal case has been made by Professor H. T. fuFANY, in 14 CoL. L. Rsv. 
389, 399. H~ there says : "The view referred to has no considerations of 
policy or convenience in its favor, and its necessary result is considerably to 
detract from the practical utility of the doctrine of conditional delivery. 
One objection to such a view would seem to lie in the fact that the doctrine 
of conditional delivery is not peculiar to conveyances of land, but is recog-
nized also in connection with contracts under seal and also bills and notes. 
If there can be no· conditional delivery of a conveyance in the absence of a 
contract of sale, that is, a contract to execute a conveyance, it would seem 
~ reasonable inference that there can be no conditional delivery of a con-
tract under seal or a promissory note unless there is a contract to execute 
such an instrument. There is no more reason for requiring an auxiliary 
contract in the one case than in the others. Yet it has never been suggested, 
so far as the writer knows, that there can be a conditional delivery of a 
contract under seal or a promissory note only when there is a legally valid 
contract to execute the contract or note. Another consideration adverse to 
the view referred to lies in the fact that, while the doctrine of delivery in 
escrow was recognized at least as early as the first half of the fifteenth century 
(see Y. B. l3°HEN. IV, 8; Y. B. 8 Hr:N. VI, 26; Y. B. IO Hr:N. VI, 25), a pure-
ly executory contract, not under seal, was not then enforceable either in the 
common law courts, or, it appears, in chancery. That being the case, the 
requirements of an extraneous contract in order to make the delivery in 
escrow effective would, in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, have necessi-
tated a contract under seal, and it seems hardly probable that snch a delivery 
of an obligation or conveyance under seal was always accompanied by an-
other obligation under seal calling for its execution. The subject of de-
livery in escrow .is treated with considerable fulriess in at least two of the 
earlier books (PERKINS, CONVEYANCING, §§138-144; SHEPPARD'S ToucHSTONE, 
.SS, 59), and there is not the slightest suggestion in either as to the necessity 
of such an auxiliary contract. It is, to say the least, somewhat extraordinary 
that an integral element in a doctrine dating from the commencement of the 
fifteenth century should have remained to be discovered by a California court 
in the latter half of the nineteenth." 
An agreement for the sale and conveyance of property, the consumma-
tion of the transaction to be postponed until payment of the purchase price 
or performance of some condition, is usually worked out in one of two ways : 
a binding, enforceable contract calling for the execution of a · proper con-
veyance is entered into, or the conveyance is prepared at once, fully executed 
by the grantor with the exception of a complete delivery, and deposited with 
a third party in escrow to be fully operative t:pon the happening of the 
event specified. In the first, upon performance by th" vendee and refusal 
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by the vendor, an action on the contract, normally, in the case of land, at 
least, for specific performance, is the remedy, and in such case it is of course 
vitally important that there be shown a binding contract. In the second, title 
passes ipso facto upon the performa11ce ·by the purchaser, and the handing of 
the deed over to him is for tha purpose unnecessary. It is submitted that 
in such cases it is not material. that there is no enforceable agreement, and 
to hold, as in the principal case, that such agreement is necessary is to con-
fuse the al)ove two methods of accomplishing such a business transaction. 
Nor is such contract necessary to prevent.the grantor from withdrawing his 
deed from the depositary, for by hypothesis the deed has been delivered 
by the maker to a third party, as to such transaction not the representative of 
the grantor, to be delivered to the grantee therein upon the happening of the 
event. As to the maker, such deed is a completed legal act. The very 
nature of an escrow therefore is such, it is submitted, that so long as the 
grantee has still the privilege of performing, the custodian may very properly, 
even must, say to the grantor upon demand for tl:].e instrument that he can-
not comply. 
In Farley v. Palmer, 70 Oh. St. 223, (I870), although the case might well 
have been disposed of on another ground, there is a very nice inst~ce of 
the working out of the correct doctrine. Palmer and wife had contracted 
to sell and convey her land to Farley, and a deed signed, etc., by Palmer 
and wife had been executed and deposited in escrow to await the payment 
of the purchase price. Upon refusal by Farley to perform, Palmer and 
wife sued Farley to compel him to pay the price. He defended on the ground 
that since Mrs. Palmer as a married woman was not bound by the contract 
he could not be compelled to perform. The court, however, rejected this 
contention, holding that Mrs. P'almer had already performed, that she had 
no power to revoke the deed, and that upon performance by Farley the title 
would have vested in him ipso facto without further delivery. R W. A. 
LIMITATIONS UPON THE UsE, AFTER SALE, OF PATENTED ARTICLES.-ln the 
case of Motion Pict11re Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 37 Sup. Ct. 4I6, 
the Supreme Court has just rendered a decision which reverses the much 
discussed case of Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. I. The opinion was by a 
divided court, however, as three of the justices dissented, and Justice Mc-
REYNOLDS "concurred in the result" only. It can, therefore, hardly be said 
to ·settle the ultimate rule as in contradiction to that followed in Henry v. 
Dick Co., and discussion of the case is of something more than mere academic 
value. 
The facts were that the plaintiff was owner of a patent covering a neces-
sary part of the mechanism on moving picture projecting machines. This 
particular device was of such efficiency as to be in general use, to the prac'-
tical exclusion of all substitutes. The plaintiff granted a license to manu-
facture and sell these parts, the licensee agreeing that it would not sell them ex-
cept under agreement with each vendee, for himself and his assigns, that they 
should be used only with a certain type of film. This licensee sold a machine 
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to an exhibition company which, in tum, transferred it to the defendant, the 
Prague Amusement Company. There was no privity -of contract between this 
defendant and the plaintiff, but the defendant took the machine with notice 
of the restriction. The defendant,. the Universal Film Manufacturing Com-
pany, supplied films to the Prague Company for use ·On the machine, having 
itself been notified of the restriction. The question raised was whether the 
-restriction upon the use of the machine was enforcible against one not a 
party to the agreement, but who had notice of it. 
The restriction is, in appearance, one upon the full and free enjoyment 
of a corporeal chattel, placed there by an erstwhile owner who has parted 
with the title. The obvious inquiry is whether limitations upon the perfect 
ownership of personal property are enforcible in the. courts. 
It may be said at the outset that in this particular respect the Patent 
Statute does not affect the inquiry. It provides nothing in respect to the 
ownership of property nor its transfer, except in the indirect way to be re-
ferred to later. All it does is to create a new form of incorporeal property, 
namely, the legal right in a patentee to exclude others from enjoyment of 
his invention. The invention itself is not corporeal, it is a concept of means 
to an end. It is the "ownership" of this concept which the Patent Statute 
creates. 
Whether restrictions upon the enjoyment of personal property are en-
forcible at common law is undecided. Negative restrictions upon the com-
plete enjoyme11t of real property may be so created as to be enforcible at 
law, or, as in England, in equity, against subsequent owners acquiring the 
property with notice. TIFFANY, REAL PRoP., §349· The reason given by 
one court, (Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632), is simply 
that "restrictions and limitations which may be put on property by means 
of such stipulations, derive .their validity from the right which every owner 
of the fee has to dispose of his estate, either absolµtely or by a qualified 
grant, or to regulate the manner in which it shall be used and occupied." 
Restrictions as to the 'type of use of real estate are common. Blakemore v. 
Stanley, 159 Mass. 6; Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 494. 
The fundamental reason for allowing them is of course merely one of 
public policy, and its expression, as formulated by the court quoted from, 
applies to personal property as pertinently as it does to real estate. But 
that it does not in fact extend to personal property is indicated in occasional 
dicta. A writer in 28 LAW QUARTERLY REVIE\V., 73, says, "In the case of 
chattels generally, any restFiction as to their use can only be imposed by 
means of a contractual relation between a vendor and his purchaser, and 
will extend no further than the contractual relation extends." He cites no 
authority, however, and the present writer can find none except in resp'ect 
to restrictions upon the re-sale price. Although these particular restrictions 
ar'! held unenforcible, that does not necessarily indicate a difference between 
other- restrictions on personalty and those on realty, because restrictio~s upon 
the alienation of real property are also held in disfavor by the courts. GRAY, 
R£STRAINTS o~ ALIENATION. In some of the cases holding price restric-
tions unenforcible there are intimations tliat all restrictions come under the 
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same ·rule. Thus the court in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 
24, 39, in passing µpon the validity of a system of contracts restricting re-sale 
price., says, "It is also a general rule of the common law that a contract 
restricting the use or controlling sub-sales can not be annexed to a chattel 
so as to follow the article and obligate the sub-purchaser by operation of 
notice. A covenant which. may be valid and run with land will not run 
with or attach itself to a mere, chattel." See also, Taddy v. Sterious, [1904], 
l Ch. Div., 354; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373-
A few other cases indicate, by analogy, a difference in respect to restrictions 
upon realty and personalty in holding that although express warranties run 
with the ownership of the former they do not follow that of the latter. Smith 
v. Williams, n7 Ga. 782; Prater v. Campbell, IIO Ky. 23. 
This uncertain state of the common law certainly permits a decision that 
restrictions upon its use can not be made to follow the ownership of a 
chaftel. The decision in the Motion Picture Patents case is therefore per-
fectly sound, if one considers the restriction in that case as one sought to be 
imposed by the plaintiff upon the use of the projecting machine. 
But was this restriction, after all, created by the plaintiff or any other 
owner of the chattel? Did the plaintiff not, rather, release, to a limited 
extent, a restriction upon the defendant's use ·of the chattel, which was 
actually imposed by the Patent Statute? Ownership of a chattel, however 
untrammelled by agreement it may be, does not ipso facto connote and carry 
with it an unrestricted right to use the chattel. By virtue of the Patent 
Statute, the owner is precluded from using it at all, if its use happens to 
constitute enjoyment of a patented invention. Even though the· owner may 
have created the chattel himself, he is absolutely restrained from its use under 
such circumstances. The patentee of an invention may refuse permission tQ 
any or all owners of chattels, which embody his invention, to use them, how-
ever their ownership :tnay have been come by. Continental Paper Bag Co. 
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405. 
The writer can think of no reason why, if a patentee in his own discretion 
can forbid or permit l1-n owner to use his property, be may not grant a 
modified permission, and limit the extent of the authorized use. It is at least 
the logical postulate that if the right to use, regardless of ownership, depends 
upon permission, wholly at the patentee's discretion, be may grant the right 
of use to such greater or less exent as his discretion dictates. When a 
patentee 'himself sells a tangible thing embodying his invention, the presump-
tion is that he gives with it all the usual rights of ownership unrestricted by his 
own patent monopoly. But when in selling the thing he delimits the right 
of user by express stipulation, there is no room for any such presumption. 
This has been the holding of practically all the cases prior to the principal 
one, although it must be confessed that reisons given have not always been 
either definite or consistent. The courts have upheld limitations which al-
lowed invasion of the monopoly in a specified respect only (Pope Mfg. Co. v. 
Gormully, 144 U. S. 248), or for sp!!cified purposes only (Gamewell Fire-
alarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, 14 Fed. 255), or which gave the right to 
use a particular machine on condition that no other machines of the same 
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kind be used (United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202), or to use the device 
only at the licensee's place of business' (R11bber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788), 
.or to use on condition that the product of the device should not be sold 
below a certain price (Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70), or to 
use for a limited time only (Mitcl7ell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544). Permission 
to use only with certain films, seems to be an absolute analogy. It ·has been 
held, also, that one who voluntarily or othernrise pays full damages for 
having unauthorizedly made, used or sold a chattel embodying a patented in-
vention does not thereby acquire any right to continued use or enjoyment 
of the chattel, nor is his vendee thereof in any better position. Birdsell v. 
Shaliol, n2 U. S. 485. And this is despite the fact that the one so precluded 
from enjoyment is in all other respects the "owner" of the particular thing. 
These restrictions have been enforced as though they were unreleased 
restrictions of the patent law, and not as limitations original)y imposed by 
one individual upon another. This is the ground on which the decision was 
expressly based, in the English case of Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo, 
12 R~p. Pat. Cas. 262. "The patentee,'' said that court, "has the sole right of 
using and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with 
them at all. Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them 
or dealing in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to 
say, to impose his own conditions." In accord are, British M'litoscope & Bio-
graph Co. v. Homer, [1901], l Ch. Div. 671; National Phonograph Co. v. 
Menck, [19n], A. C. 336. All of this authority is completely in accord with 
the holding of Henry v. Dick Co., which cites still other precedents. 
When one recognizes the restriction of use in the Motion Picture Patents 
case for what it really is, namely, a limited release of a statutory restriction~ 
and is not misled by its mere form of expression, the decision in the case is 
-learly in conflict with both logic and precedent. The court admits itself to 
ave been influenced by a feeling that the restriction, if sustained, "would be 
ravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a 
avorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes." The fault 
owever, if any, _is with the Patent Statute which imposed the restriction, 
:i:ather than with.the patentee who relieved the public, at least to some extent, 
from its rigorous and absolute prohibitions. J. B. W. 
DUl! PRoc:tss OF LA w AND TR:£ R:i;cm.ATION OF HoURs 01.t LABoR.-§2 of 
Chapter 102, Oregon Laws of 1913, provides: "No person shall be employed 
}n any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment in this State more than 
. ten hours in any one day, except watchmen and employes when engaged in 
making necessary repairs, or in cases of emergency, where life or property 
.is in immiment danger; provided, however, employes may work overtime 
not to exceed three hours in any one day, conditioned that payment be made 
for such overtime at the rate of time and one-half of the regular wage." The 
plaintiff in error was found guilty of causing one of his employes to work 
for thirteen hours in 011-e day, the employe not being within the excepted 
conditions and not being _paid the rate prescribed for overtime. The United 
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States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the statute is 
consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment. Bunting v. Orego>i, 37 Sup. 
Ct. 435. 
The plaintiff in error's conviction had been upheld by the Supreme Court 
-0f Oregon. Bunting v. Oregon, 71 Ore. 259. The appeal raised two ques-
tions: "(I) Is the law a wage law, or an hour of service law? And (2) if 
the latter, has it equality of operation?" The contention of plaintiff in error 
was that this was a law regulating wages, the argument being as follows: 
The employer is prohibited from working the employe more than thirteen 
hours a day, and thus in respect to thirteen hours it may be said to be a 
regulation of the hours of labor; but where the employe works more than 
ten hours a day, the employer must pay him at the rate of one and a half 
times the market price for such overtime. The wrong complained of is the 
failure of plaintiff in error to pay for such overtime at the increased rate 
pro~ided for by statute; if the conviction of plaintiff iti error is affirmed, it 
win result in compelling employers to pay one and one-half times the market 
rate for labor above ten hours per day. The majority of the court, however, 
considered that the· statement in §1 of the statute, to the effect that the 
purpose was to guard the health of the laborer, must be respected. The ex-
planation of the state cpurt as to the higher rate of compensation for over-
time was adopted: "Apparently the provisions permitting labor for the over-
time on express conditions were made in order to facilitate the enforcement 
of the law, and in the nature of a mild penalty for employing one not more 
than three hours overtime." Therefore, the court did not find it necessary 
to determine what its decision would be if it had been of the opinion that 
this was in fact a regulation of wages. The opinion in the Adamson Law 
case OVilson v. New, 37 Sup. Ct. 298), is not referred to, nor are such 
leading cases as Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 .Sup. Ct. 
383; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, ~9 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 3 
Ann. Cas. II33; Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct. 
324, 13 Ann. Cas. 957. This failure to cite cases, however, is in line with the 
realization that each case involving the regulation of labor must be decided 
on facts and figures, not on theories and precedents. Each case is a new 
problem. Yet it is evident that the court is no longer willing to stand by 
its opinion in the Lochner case, where the prohibition was against employ-
ment in bakeries for more than ten hours a ·day. A new modus operandi 
for determining the constitutionality of such statutes has been adopted. No 
longer is the question of whether or not the trade is so unhealthy as to 
necessitate the regulation of its hours weighed in the scale of "common 
understanding'' as in the Lochner case;·but, beginning witli Muller v. Oregon, 
counsel have seen the wisdom of furnishing the court with scientific data 
and opinions by experts upon the question as to the proper number of work-
ing hours in various industries. Mr. Louis D. BRANDEIS in the preparation 
of the Muller case made a radical step in the art of advocacy when he re-
frained from citing numerous decided cases as precedents for his contentions, 
but rather quoted from the reports of over ninety committees, bureaus of 
statistics, commissioners of hygiene, etc., to the effect that long hours were 
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injurious to the health of employes. The decisions in those cases argued orr 
this basis speak loudly for tlie effectiveness and wisdom of this method of 
advocacy. In People v. Schweinler Press, 2I4 N. Y. 395, 410, Io8 N. E. 639, 
overruling Peo(>le v. Williams, I89 N. Y. I3I, 8I N. E. 778, the court states 
that when the previous case was decided it did not have the benefit of 
scientific data on the subject, and now that it has before it the result of re-
search as to the proper hours for labor, it is prepared to reach an opposite 
conclusion from that expressed in the prior case. Is it too much to say that 
the Lochner case would have been differently decided had the court been 
properly presented with scientific data bearing on the unhealthfulness of more· 
than ten hours labor per day in bakeries? 
As the court regarded the law as one regulating the hours of service and 
not wages, it had no difficulty in disposing of the sernnd ground of appeal, 
i. e., that the law violates the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth 
amendment in that it makes the employer in a mill, factory, or manufacturing 
establisliment pay more for labor than other employers are required to pay. 
But the court having reached the determination that the effect of the law 
was not to regulate wages, an argument based on that assumption must fall 
along with its premise. Regarding the law as a regulation of hours of labor, 
there is sufficient basis for the classification adopted by the legislature. 
It is worthy to note that the Chief Justice, Justice VAN DEVAN'f:ER and 
Justice McREYNOLDS dissented. As no dissenting opinion was published, the 
reviewer refrains from attempting to state the exact grounds of their dis-
sent. Justice BRANDEIS, having been interested in the preparation of brief 
for the defendant in error, took no part in the consideration or the decision. 
The brief filed by the defendant in error is voluminous and exhaustive, ap-
parently all the scientific data and opinion on the question of the disadvant-
ages of long hours of labor having been S!!t forth. See also I8 YAL!~ L. 
JOURNAL 454; 29 HARV. L. REV. 353; IS MICHL. REv. 259. W. L. 0. 
THE MATF.RIALMAN'S LIEN AND THE TITLE OF THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY-
-§47a(2) of the BANKRUPTCY ACT as amended in I9IO, gives the trustee the 
rights of lien creditors over property in. the custody of or coming into the 
custody of the bankruptcy court, and of judgment creditors holding an 
execution duly returned unsatisfied over property not in the court's custody. 
Despite this section, the New York Court of Appeals decided in the recent 
case of Gates v. Stevens Co11strnction Co., IIS N. E. 22, that a materialman 
who had furnished materials to a bankrupt prior to the filing of the petition 
and adjudication, and who had filed notice of his lien aiter such adjudication 
but within the statutory period is entitled to his lien, and that the trustee in 
bankruptcy, in taking title to moneys due to the bankrupt, takes ·title subject 
to the materialman's lien. 
In New York and in most, if not all, of the states, the materialman, by 
filing notice within the statutory time, perfects his equitable lien, which 
begins in inchoate form when the first material is furnished. A general 
assignee for the benefit of creditors, )laving no greater right than· the assignor 
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himself, takes subject to the materialman's lien, filed subsequent to the assign-
ment but within the statutory period. Jolm P. Kane Co. v. Kill11ey, 174 N. 
Y. 6g, 66 N. E. 619. The trustee in bankruptcy, prior to the 1910 amend-
ment of §47a(2), had no greater rights under §70, as against the material-
man, to money due the bankrupt, than. had the bankrupt himself. Crane Co. 
v. Pneumatic Signal Co., 94 App. Div. 53, 56, 87 N. Y. Supp. 917, 919; York 
Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344-. The materialman's lien is not obtained 
through legal proceedlngs, and hence· cannot be set aside by the trustee 
under §67f. REMINGTON, (2nd Ed.), §u55. 
The court in the instant case assumes in its decision that the money 
payable to the bankrupt and subject to the materialman's lien was not in 
the actual custody of the bankruptcy court, but that there was a mere right 
to recover the money, and-following the majority decision in Hildreth 
Granite Co. v. City of Watervliet, 16! App. Div. 420, 146 N. Y. Supp. 495-
that this right is not intended to be covered by ·the first provision of the 
amendment of §47a (2), but comes explicitly within the second provision, 
under which the trustee has only such a claim as is possessed by a creditor 
with execution returned unsatisfied, namely, a right by the commencement 
of an action to establish an· equitable lien. 
In York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, supra, decided in l9o6, it was held that a 
vendor under a conditional contract of sale, which under the Ohio law was 
void as against creditors and purchasers in good faith because not filed; but 
good as between the parties thereto, could hold the property ·against a trustee 
in bankruptcy, as the latter was in no better position than the bankrupt at 
the tiine of adjudicatiop. The primary intentio"n of the 1910 amendment of 
§47a(2) was to do away with the effect of this decision by enabling the 
trustee to avoid secret and unrecorded liens. 
The question involved in the instant case is whether the amendment ex-
ceeds the primary intent, and gives the trustee a lien which will prevail over 
that of the materifllman, which at the time of adjudication had not been 
perfected. Two of the five judges in the Hildreth Granite Co. case, supra, 
dissented on the ground that the words "all property in the custody of or 
coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court" l>re not limited to property 
which has been brought into the actual physical possession of the trustee, 
By the adjudication all the property of every name and nature representing 
a money value goes to the t,rustee, who is a mere officer or instrument of 
the court, and such property is in the custody of the court, "at least so far 
as it is within the jurisdiction of the court and not in the custody of some 
other court,'; and hence that the trustee, before the materialman's lien was 
filed, had a creditor's lien within the meaning of the first provision of §47a(2)" 
and should prevail over the materialman, whose lien was not filed till after 
adjudication. 
The judge ,..;ho delivered the majority opinion in the Hildreth Granite Co. 
case cites no authority and gives no argument in support of his position, but 
cpntents himself with an expression of his belie~. The dissenting opinion, 
in addition to the argument just preceding, relies on the statement from 
Ha1to11er Natio11a.l Bank v: Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, .191, that an "adjudication 
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follows as a matter of course, and brings .the bankrupt's property into the 
·custody of the court for distribution among his creditors." Both the argu-
ment and authority relied on in the dissenting opinion seem sound, putting 
a debt on the same footing as property brought into the actual physical 
possession of the trustee, that is, it brings them within the operation of the 
1irst provision of §47a(2). 
§67 of the original act subrogated the trustee to a lien in fact acquired . 
by the creditor by legal or equitable proceedings within the four months' 
period. The class· of cases, unprovided for by the original. act, and intended 
to be reached by the 1910 amendment, was that in which no creditors had 
acquired liens by legal or equitable proceedings, and to vest in the trustee, 
for the interest of the creditors, the potential right of creditors with· such 
liens. In re Bazemore, i8g Fed. 236, 26 A. B. R. 494; In re Calhoun Supply 
Co., 189 Fed. 537, 26 A. B. R. 529. Chapter 33, §5, of the Consolidated 
I.ilws of New York (1909), the statute governing the principal case, gives to 
those furnishing state or· municipal corporations with labor or materials for 
public improvements a lien upon the "moneys of the state or such corporations 
applicable to the construction of such improvement." 
°If it be assumed that the dissenting opinion in the Hildreth Granite Co. 
ease is correct and that debts are on the same footing as tangible property 
in the trustee's physical possession, the ·question then arises whether the 
creqitor's lien possessed by the trustee should prevail over the materialman's 
lien perfected· after adjudication. Had the lien been perfected prior to the 
accrual of the "trustee~s lien, even though within the four months' period, 
it would have come within the exception o! clause (d) of §10, which provides 
that "liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in 
fraud of this act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded 
according to law if recording thereof is necessary in order to impart notice, 
shall not be affected by this act." Moreau Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 29 N. D. 
n3, 150 N. W. 563; lli?MINGToN, §u55. 
But even though a creditor's lien is superior to the materialman's unper-
fected lien, every reason exists for protecting the latter where the lien is 
not filed till after adjudication-if within the statutory period-as well as 
where it is filed before adjudication. The theory is tha~ the newness of the 
work gives notice for ninety days, after which recording is necessary as a 
reminder of the rights of the materialman. In the language of the majority 
opinion in Hildreth Granite Co. v. Watervliet, a contrary interpretation "would 
require a materialman, in order to protect his rights, to :file a new lien imme-
diately after each load of material furnished, lest the contractor might file a 
petition in bankruptcy and .defeat his rights." S. D. F. 
